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The world economy today is in a period of stable growth
which has persisted since 1983. In 1989, the perestroika
movement spread from the Soviet Union and led to various
structural changes in Eastern European countries. Since the
latter half of 1989, the relationship between East and West
has changed concretely, as represented by the fall of the
Berlin Wall. Hungary and Poland abandoned the one-party
despotism of Communism. As 1990 began, observer status for
Soviet Union participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) was resolved. In view of these events the
world is considered to be facing a significant turning point.
At the same time, however, some problems remain to be
resolved, such as the rising tide of protectionism and the
insufficient flow of funds to nations with large cumulative
debts. Some economists say that current economic conditions
are similar to those of the 1920s and that there exists the
possibility of another Great Depression. Many factors are
considered to have triggered the Great Depression, one of
which is the insufficient flow of funds between surplus and
debtor nations. This factor provides a primary focus of this
study.
Chapter II provides a look back at the Japanese economy
during the Showa era (1926-1989) and it describes how Japan
developed, especially after the Second World War. Following
this chapter, the focus is narrowed to today's economic
climate, specifically the role of Japan money and debtor
nations' problems. Chapter III, "Japan Money," explores the
role of Japan money and Oil money, how they have changed
during the past twenty years, and how they have contributed to
debtor nations' problems. Chapter IV, "Debtor Nations'
Problems," describes the situation in debtor countries and
examines the main factors contributing to those nations'
problems.
Chapter V, "The Lessons of History, " describes problems,
such as the insufficient flow of funds to debtor nations
before World War II and some determinants of the Great
Depression. The problem of an insufficient flow of funds to
debtor nations exists today, and is considered by some to have
2been the main trigger of the Great Depression. Chapter VI,
"A Comparison of the 1920s and the 1980s," examines the
aggregate global economy in the 1920s and in the 1980s.
In this thesis Japanese long-term and short-term capital
flows to foreign countries are defined as "Japan money."
2For a good discussion of the main trigger of the Great
Depression, see Kanamori , Hisao. "Sekai Daikyoukou eno Keikoku,"
Toyokeizai Shinpousya, p. 38-46, 1989.
Chapter VII, "Economic Roles for Japan," describes Japan's
3
role as an economic superpower, poised to play a role in
helping to create a global economic environment which will
avoid the same conditions that led to the Great Depression and
ultimately to the Second World War.
3Japanese economy is still half the size (in terms of GNP) of
the U.S., but growing (see Figure 1-1 and 2-2).
II. THE JAPANESE ECONOMY IN THE SHOWA ERA (1926-1989)
4During the Showa era Japan faced numerous economic
challenges but was able to overcome them and eventually attain
steady and healthy expansion. During the first half of the
Showa era, in the midst of grim international conditions such
as the Great Depression, Japan was directly confronted by
harsh economic realities, some of which ultimately led to the
Second World War (see Chapter V). At the war's end, Japan's
5domestic economy was nearly devastated.
After the Second World War, thanks to a favorable
international trading climate and the productivity of the
Japanese people, Japan's economy started to recover and
achieved high levels of growth, overcoming obstacles such as
the oil crises and trade frictions, to become the second
greatest economic power (in terms of GNP) in the free world.
At present, the Japanese economy is characterized by high
levels of real income and consumption. As a global power,
Japan has reached the point of assuming a vital role, both in
4The Emperor Hirohito (1901-1989) reigned over the Japanese
people during the Showa era. The new era, Heisei, started in 1989
after Emperor Hirohito 's death.
For a good discussion of the Japanese economy before WWII,
see Nihon Keizai Shinbun, "Zeminaru Nihon Keizai Nyumon," Nihon
Keizai Shinbun press, 1985.
qualitative and quantitative terms, in its contribution to
world economic stability.
The interval from the end of World War II to 1955 was
marked by postwar rehabilitation. Under the new Constitution,
the Japanese Government launched a series of policies to
liberate the nation from the economic plight left by the
Second World War. These policies included:
1. implementation of a priority production system
through the establishment
Stabilization Board" in 1946;
, of the "Economic
2. promotion of democratization and competition
policies, namely dissolution of the "zaibatsu"
,
and promotion of agricultural land reforms;
g
3. restriction of government spending (Dodge Line )
to curb inflation, and
4. establishment of a favorable (360 yen/US dollar)
fixed-exchange rate in 1958.
As a result of these policies, the Japanese economy
continued to recover to the prewar level, stimulated in part
by military demand (not weapons, but supplies) arising from
9the Korean War. Finally, the economic white paper of 1956
declared that the postwar era had ended.
After World War II, the reconstruction of key industries such
as coal and steel provided the foundation for the subsequent
development of other industries.
7Zaibatsu means a monopolistic enterprise such as Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda before World War II.
o
The restrictive monetary policy for stable economic growth
that the U.S. minister Dodge, supervised in Japan in 1949.
9Issued by Economic Planning Agency, Japanese Government.
Having recovered from immediate postwar conditions,
Japan's economy went on to achieve high-level Gross National
Product (GNP) growth at an average rate of 10% or greater
during a succession of prosperous periods--" Jinmu Keiki" (1954
to 1957), "Iwato Keiki" (1958 to 1961) and "Izangi Keiki"
(1965 to 1970)--although each of these periods was also
punctuated by business recessions.
Beginning in 1960, Japan's high level of growth was
supported by a boom in plant and facilities investments, under
the slogan "Investment Calls for More Investment," and by a
surge in domestic consumption. From 1965 onward, there was a
persistent surplus in Japan's international balance of
payments.
In the 1970s, the world economy was rocked by disruptions,
such as the dissolution of the international currency
structure (the shift to the floating exchange rate system in
1973) and two oil shocks in succession (1973 and 1979). In
the wake of the "Boom to Rebuild Japan" and the "First Oil
Shock," Japan's economy was plagued by numerous difficulties,
including sharp commodity price increases leading to
merchandise trade deficits, stagflation, structural recession
of industries, and wide-scale government budget deficits.
In Keynesian model, planned expenditures on consumption (C),
investment (I), government (G), and net export (X-M) add up to
planned aggregate expenditures (Y) . Y is equal to the sum of C,
saving (S), and tax (T).Y=C+I+G+ (X-M) = C + S + T
Net foreign Investment = (X-M) = (S-I) + (T-G)
Thus, government budget deficits contribute to trade deficits
Thanks to the concerned response and flexibility of
corporations and private citizens alike, Japan was able to
transform its industrial structure in the areas of
technological development and energy conservation. The
Japanese economy thus overcame inflation, strengthened its
international competitiveness and rebuilt a foundation for
continued growth.
In the mid-1980s the U.S. trade deficit began to widen
while the trade surpluses of Japan and West Germany expanded,
generating imbalances in external-payment positions among the
advanced nations (see Figure 1-1 and 1-2). In 1985
international cooperation brought about an extensive
realignment of currencies as a response to these imbalances.
Japan's economy reacted positively to the steep rise in the
value of the yen. The country realized a new form of economic
growth led by domestic demand and supported by various
administrative and financial measures.
With the start of the Heisei era in 1989, Japan's economy
was in the midst of a business upswing more pronounced than
any other since the "Izangi Keiki" period (1965 to 1970). As
a result of smooth adaptation to an appreciating yen, growth
led by foreign and domestic demand has been achieved through
if (S-I) is constant.
11For a full discussion of these measures, see Yoshitomi
Masaru, "Ninon Keizai," Toyokeizai Sinpousya, 1989.
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Figure 1-1
Japan's Main Economic Indicators
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Figure 1-2
The U.S. Main Economic Indicators
9
investments in facilities and through private consumption (see
Figure 1-3). Although commodity prices have stabilized, the
value of total imports of foreign products have increased
dramatically: Imports for 1988 reached $91.84 billion, 39.2%
higher than 1987. Yet, Japan remains one of the world's
leading creditor nations.
10
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Figure 1-3
Comparison of Japan and U.S. Economic Trends
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III. JAPAN MONEY
Japan money has a powerful influence on international
money markets. An explanation of the difference between Japan
money and Oil money is essential to understanding why the
probability of defaults by debtor nations has recently
increased, as well as the consequences to the world economy
if Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina,
stopped making repayments on their foreign debts.
A. THE DESTINATION OF JAPAN MONEY
Foreign currency earned through Japanese companies has
been increasing year after year. As a result, the current
account for 1989 closed with a surplus of $57 billion (see
Figure 3-1). This surplus was used mostly for overseas
investments, which reached $136.5 billion annual rate in 1987
[Ref. 2]. During the past several years, the surplus in
Japan's merchandise trade balance outweighed the negative
capital- account balance (see Figure 1-1).
As a result of foreign investment, Japan has built up an
enormous amount of net assets overseas. America, once the
biggest creditor, became the biggest debtor in 1985, primarily
as a result of large current-account deficits in the early
1980s. On the other hand, Japan has gradually become the
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Source: White paper on International Trade Japan 1990
Figure 3-1
Japan's Current Account Balance
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nation with $129.8 billion worth of net foreign assets in 1985
[Ref. 3]. Japan's record of overseas investments during 1985
shows that the ratio of portfolio investment was large and the
cash flow to the U.S. and the European Community (EC)
expanded. Comparing the 1970s with 1985, while the flow of
commodities remained approximately the same, the flow of
capital changed significantly (see Figure 3-2). While
capital investment from Japan to developing countries
decreased, that to the U.S. and the EC increased, with a large
amount invested in U.S. government bonds.
Historically the U.S. played an important role in leading
the world economy. However, American economic growth has
slowed, partly as a result of the twin deficits, fiscal and
trade. The U.S. fiscal deficit reached a high of $220 billion
at the end of 1990 and is forecast to be $318 billion in 1991,
primarily due to increasing budgetary spending to bail out the
savings and loan industry. Much of the U.S. government budget
deficit has been financed by Japanese investment.
U.S. government bonds are regarded as excellent
investments by Japanese investors, who have confidence in the
American economy and consider the U.S. a low-risk country as
compared to developing countries. In addition, the
differential between Japanese real interest rates and those
prevailing in the U.S. attracted a substantial inflow of Japan
money. Over the period 1981-5, U.S. bonds had the advantage
14
(1) 1970s
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Figure 3-2
The Flow Of Commodity and Capital Around Japan
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over Japan's in terms of adjusted rates of return on invested
capital (see Table 3-1). High yields on U.S. bonds over this
period and appreciation of the dollar vis-a-vis the yen
further enhanced the desirability of U.S. investment.
Worthy of mention is that in 1985 the high value of the
dollar, the high cost of money, and the high cost of crude oil
were tempered after the G5 meeting. In 1986 the U.S. Federal
Reserve Board (FRB) had cut its official central bank rate in
four steps from 7.5% to 5.5%, while Japan did the same in an
apparent effort to stay in step with the U.S. That action
provides some evidence that the U.S. budget deficit partly
supported by Japanese investments, could not be sustained
without maintaining interest-rate differentials between the
two countries (see Figure 3-3).
B. JAPAN MONEY AND OIL MONEY
After the outbreak of the Middle East war in October of
1973, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OAPEC) threatened oil production cutbacks and embargoes to
non-friendly nations, resulting in a subsequent rise in oil
prices. After that, the strategy was taken over by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the
oil price jumped to $34/bbl after the second oil price shock
(in 1979-80). Oil prices* rose almost 12.5 times due to the
two oil crises. Thanks to this, world money became
concentrated in the OPEC countries as measured by the world
16
TABLE 3-1
THE ADJUSTED RATES OF RETURN ON INVESTED BOND
IN THE U.S. AND IN JAPAN
(%)
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Bond







1.18 2.27 4.83 1.78 a 7.32
Total
Rate of 15.54 25.90 10.90 15.03 12.42
Return
Bond







Rate of 10.64 9.69 10.53 9.84 3.92
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Figure 3-3
Official Central Bank Rate In The U.S. And In Japan
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oil import bill. As Table 3-2 indicates, current account
payments showed rapid changes during 1974. In particular,
OPEC's current account increased sharply to $59.5 from $7.5
billion the previous year.
Oil money collected by the oil-producing countries was
used for their own industrial modernization and recycled into
developing countries by the way of banks in Europe, America,
and Japan. In 1980 the flow of funds to developing countries
from OPEC alone reached $44 billion (see Figure 3-4). Total
funds to developing countries through the Euromarket, advanced
countries, and international organizations such as
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, etc., amounted
to $91.2 billion.
OPEC's role as a supplier of funds did not last long.
After the second oil crisis, the advanced countries reduced
their demand for oil through conservation and use of more
fuel-efficient cars (which incidentally provided a boost to
Japan's car manufacturers in terms of foreign sales). These
measures, together with the development of oil fields in
Mexico, the North Sea and other areas led to competition with
OPEC and lower real (and nominal) prices of oil. OPEC's share
in the world oil market gradually shrank, and OPEC's current-
account balance fell into deficit by $15 billion in 1982 (see
Table 3-2). As a consequence, Oil money began withdrawing
from the Euromarket and the developing countries (see Figure
19
TABLE 3-2











1970 6.8 a 0.5 A 8.1 a 2.9 4.7
71 9.9 0.3 a 9.8 a 2.7 2.3
72 7.8 1.3 a 5.2 a 1.9 2.0
73 10.5 7.5 a 7.5 a 3.5 7.0
74 a 26.0 59.5 a 26.0 a 9.5 A 2.0
75 a 0.5 27.0 a 30.0 a 18.0 A 21.5
76 a 18.0 36.5 a 17.5 a 13.0 12.0
77 a 24.0 29.0 a 12.5 a 8.5 16.0
78 10.0 4.5 a 22.5 a 9.5 17.5
79 a 28.0 61.0 a 38.0 a 4.0 9.0
80 a 69.0 115.0 a 63.0 A 11.0 A 28.0
81 a 28.0 52.0 a 76.0 A 10.0 A 62.0
82 a 28.0 a 15.0 a 68.0 8.0 A 103.0
83 a 23.0 a 20.0 a 37.0 11.0 A 69.0
84 a 64.0 a 19.0 a 21.0 11.0 A 93.0
85 a 72.0 a 26.0 a 27.0 3.0 A 122.0
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Source: White Paper on International Trade Japan 1986
Figure 3-4
The Flow of Funds To Developing Countries
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3-4). By 1982, the problem of debt repayment in developing
countries began to emerge (see Chapter IV).
Japan money has replaced much OPEC Oil money since 1982.
Japan money, however, has been invested more in U.S. and EC
capital markets than in developing countries, whereas Oil
money was invested more heavily in developing countries. This
is an important distinction between Japan money and Oil money.
Today many developing nations are teetering on the brink
of bankruptcy, and their national per capita incomes have
dropped considerably. The more interdependent the economies
of the world become, the more important it is for advanced
countries to encourage economic cooperation with developing
nations to sustain the world economy. Japan has an obligation
in this regard, and in this way will gain the confidence of
the world community.
Under the Official Development Assistance (ODA) program,
in 1988 Japan's total economic assistance (ODA + private
sector + non-profit organization) amounted to $21.4 billion,
or 4.7% higher than a year ago [Ref. 4]. This figure
accounted for 21% of the total worldwide flow of funds to
developing countries, which was $102.9 billion. Japan has
ranked first in the world since 1985 [Ref. 4]. In terms of
percentages of GNP, Japanese assistance declined from 0.86%
the previous year, to 0.75% [Ref. 4], but it remains above the
average for OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
22
members. Japan is still the world's largest provider of funds
for developing countries but not the largest in terms of
shares of GNP.
Steady efforts are being made to expand ODA based upon the
Fourth Intermediate Goals set in June 1988, which specify that
in the five-year period between 1988 and 1992, total ODA is to
be increased by more than two times the total for the previous
five-year period to above $50 billion. ODA for the first
target year of 1988 came to $9.18 billion, a big jump of 22.5%
compared to the total of $7.45 billion in the preceding year.
That figure came close to the American total of $10.14 billion
for the same year. For this reason, ODA as a percentage of
GNP also rose from 0.31% to 0.32%. The relative weight of
Japan's contribution to the total ODA provided by DAC member
countries rose from 17.7% in 1987 to 19% in 1988 [Ref. 5].
Japan became the world's largest provider of economic
assistance in 1985, partly because the U.S. private sector
recalled funds from developing countries. These credit
institutions stopped granting additional loans to countries in
Latin America and started collecting (and writing off) their
credits.
Although Japan has been ranked first in the world since
1985 in terms of dollars in aid, the nation is seventh (0.75%)
in terms of GNP 12 after Australia (1.52%), Holland (1.18%),
12The U.S. was ninth (0.36%)
23
Sweden (1.13%), Norway (1.03%), France (0.99%) and West
Germany (0.98%) [Ref. 5]. The U.S. has cut its economic aid,
mainly because of the enactment of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act (the Gramm-Rudman Act).
Diminished U.S. aid has motivated other nations, including
Japan, to fill the gap. Indeed, Japan is expected to become
the world's largest provider of ODA.
24
IV. DEBTOR NATIONS' PROBLEMS
A significant part of Latin American debt is caused by the
declining (real) price of primary products such as
agricultural commodities, crude oil and mining. As a result,
debt-service ratios (annual interest and principal payments as
a percentage of export earnings) remain high in many
countries.
A. THE DECLINING PRICE OF PRIMARY PRODUCTS AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
On June 6, 1986, Mexico's Minister of Finance announced,
"I do not deny the possibility of a moratorium on loan
payments" [Ref. 6]. The news shook world money markets,
because bankers with huge loans to Mexico were concerned they
might sink into bankruptcy if Mexico defaulted on its loan
payments.
The same situation with Mexico had previously occurred in
August 1982; but various countermeasures, including emergency
loans from the IMF and the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) for $4.5 billion and $1.9 billion respectively, helped
Mexico toward recovery. Unfortunately, a sharp fall in crude
oil prices and the deterioration in Mexico's balance of
payments ultimately led the country back into insolvency.
A look back over the pattern of the declining prices of
primary products during this period is instructive. In March
25
1983 OPEC cut its export price by $5/bbl, to $29/bbl, in order
to preserve market share. Contrary to OPEC's oil price
stabilization policy, oil prices on the international spot
market had softened considerably. Therefore, in October 1985,
Saudi Arabia, which had played an important role as the swing-
producer, could no longer endure the heavy economic burden and
decided to increase its oil production. Additionally, in
December 1985, OPEC formulated its policy on the basis of
"securing and keeping a fair market share" which meant that
retaining market share was more important than keeping the oil
price up. As a result, the spot market price gradually
declined (see Table 4-1).
In early 1986, to recover from the sharp fall in oil
prices, OPEC had several meetings. At extraordinary general
meetings in March and April of 1986, the agenda was the
establishment of an upper limit on oil production and a
country-by-country oil production quota. The meetings ended
in a stalemate because of conflicting interests.
In any case, the declining price of crude oil would soon
have an impact on the world economy. For developed nations
and non-oil producing developing countries the less expensive
price on crude would lead to lower cost oil imports and help
protect their economies from imported inflation.
The trend of non-oil primary product prices in 1985-86 was
lower than in the January-March 1984 period, when the index
26
TABLE 4-1
CHANGE OF OIL PRICE
($/bbl)








Jan - Mar 31.00 29.33 29.20 33.73
Apr - Jun 29.00 28.68 29.73 29.94
Jul - Sep 28.90 30.87 29.52
Oct - Dec 28.35 29.03 29.68
1984
Jan - Mar 28.50 29.55 29.52
Apr - Jun 28.38 29.83 29.46
Jul - Sep 27.68 28.40 29.35
Oct - Dec 28.00 27.68 27.77 29.11
1985
Jan - Mar 27.75 27.67 28.70
Apr - Jun 27.10 26.90 28.34
Jul - Sep 27.25 26.90 27.57




Mar 27.20 17.80 25.91
Source: Economic White paper of 1986
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reached a peak of 100 (see Table 4-2). The main factor behind
the price decline was slackening consumer demand due to world
economic downturn. Lowered consumer demand led to excess
supply in the U.S., EC, China, Latin America and South-east
Asia, and subsequent declines in non-oil product prices
aggravated the debtor nations' problems.
After the international financial crisis originated from
Mexico in 1982, harsher economic conditions in debt-ridden
Latin America began to make themselves felt. In order to
service their debts or obtain further financing from the IMF,
Latin American countries have been forced to scale down their
government budget expenditures as well as capture foreign
13
currency by increasing exports. For example, In crop year
1981-82, about 48% of wheat exports were from the U.S. and 4%
were from Argentina; in 1984-85, U.S. wheat exports declined
to 38% while Argentina's crop doubled. Soybeans were the
same: U.S. exports fell to 38% while Argentina's doubled, and
Brazil produced four times its previous total. The total
value of soybean exports in both Argentina and Brazil
increased to 27% from 9% over a three-year period [Ref. 7].
Unfortunately, Latin America's increased market supply of
these crops led to a steep decline in crop prices.
















1975 100 100 100 100
76 106 106 105 109
77 107 108 110 107
78 95 97 97 101
79 108 97 95 117
80 143 99 101 118
81 158 98 95 110
82 153 91 86 98
83 146 95 88 104
84 149 98 87 103
85 141 89 78 96
1982
Jan - Mar 153 94 90 102
Apr - Jun 151 93 87 96
Jul - Sep 152 89 83 97
Oct - Dec 157 91 85 99
1983
Jan - Mar 147 90 84 98
Apr - Jun 142 94 88 107
Jul - Sep 145 96 89 107
Oct - Dec 146 97 90 101
1984
Jan - Mar 147 100 89 106
Apr - Jun 146 99 88 104
Jul - Sep 152 98 88 103
Oct - Dec 151 96 83 101
1985
Jan - Mar 152 95 82 102
Apr - Jun 146 92 79 101
Jul - Sep 139 87 76 95
Oct - Dec 131 83 76 88
Source: Economic White paper of 1986
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Prices of non-ferrous metals experienced a similar
situation. Since Chile increased copper exports to obtain
foreign currency, copper prices dropped to $0.60/lb in 1986
from $l/lb in 1980 [Ref. 7].
The declining price of primary products not only decreased
export earnings, but also delayed economic growth in
developing countries highly dependent on these products. As
a result, the debtor nations' problems became more serious.
B. THE DEBTOR NATIONS' PROBLEMS
A main factor contributing to the debtor nations' problems
is the declining price of primary products. Also, as Oil
money withdrew from the Euromarket, debtor nations found it
increasingly difficult to roll over loan payments or borrow
funds including interest and principal.
Other factors contributing to the problem are high
interest rates and the erosion of U.S. purchasing power caused
by weakened economic growth. High interest rates result in a
heavier debt- servicing burden, while lowered U.S. purchasing
power means a decrease in exports to one of the world's
largest consumers.
In spite of a drastic correction in real interest rates
and the high dollar beginning in 1986, Mexico's rescheduling
of debt repayment in June -1986 suggests that the main factor
in the debt problem is the declining price of primary
products. Table 4-3 shows that the declining price of crude
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TABLE 4-3
INFLUENCE BY A FALL IN THE INTEREST RATE




















Brazil 107.3 90.3 84.2 + 1.8 + 1.8
Mexico 99.0 88.2 89.1 + 1.8 - 3.8
Argentina 50.8 44.1 86.8 + 0.9
Korea 44.5 30.9 69.4 + 0.6 + 1.4
Venezuela 33.6 33.4 99.5 + 0.7 - 3.2
Indonesia 30.9 14.2 46.0 + 0.3 - 2.4
Philippines 24.8 16.8 67.8 + 0.3 + 0.3
Nigeria 19.3 17.0 88.2 + 0.3 - 3.3
Peru 13.4 8.1 60.7 +. 0.2 - 0.2
Ecuador 8.5 6.3 73.8 + 0.1 - 0.5
Source: White Paper on International Trade Japan 1986
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oil has an increasingly strong impact on the international
accounts of debtor nations.
Surprisingly enough, developing countries are responsible
for an enormous amount of all debtor nations' accumulated
debt, which reached $1,193 billion in 1989 [Ref. 8]. For
developing countries, long-term debt is more advantageous than
short-term debt (a borrowing period less than a year), and it
is ideal for the borrowing period to coincide with a period
for which a development project using a loan could be
completed. On the other hand, for creditor nations long-term
debt has a high risk associated with it.
Table 4-4 shows the debt- servicing capability of
borrowers. In 1983 the balance of debts reached 29.9% in
14terms of percentage of GNP. Debt-Service Ratio (DSR) and
Interest-Service Ratio (ISR) reached 19.1% and 10.0%
respectively. The DSR and ISR of major developing country
debtor nations were even larger than above. It is said that
the DSR and ISR are the most useful indices to represent the
debt-service capability of nations. A DSR over 20% is
typically used as an indicator of potential debt repayment
problems. This implies that most debtor nations are in a
dangerous situation and a major default could occur.
14DSR = Debt Repayment/Exports
15ISR = Interest Payment/Exports
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TABLE 4-4
BALANCE OF LONG-TERN DEBTS AND
DEBT-SERVICE CAPABILITY IN THE
DEBTOR NATIONS
<s billion)



















13.8 16.4 19.6 19.3 18.7 19.8 24.1 29.9
DSR (X) 8.5 10.1 15.4 15.8 13.5 14.8 17.2 19.1




















13.3 15.8 18.0 17.5 17.1 17.7 22.6 29.3
DSR (X) 11.2 13.6 21.0 22.1 17.9 18.0 21.0 22.1





Source: The World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1984-85
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From the point of view of lenders (mainly private banks),
there is always uncertainty associated with funds that might
never be paid back. U.S. private banks, which are the biggest
lenders in the free world to debtor nations, were in excess of
100% in terms of ratio of credit to equity capital before
Mexico's 1986 debt repayment problem (see Table 4-5). One
bank (Manufactures Hanover) was over 250%. The figures are
for only five major debtor nations; numbers would be higher if
other debtors were added. Possibility existed that many U.S.
banks would face immediate financial difficulties after
Mexico's default. On the other hand, Japanese banks had kept
a low ratio of less than 100% credit to equity, in contrast to
17U.S. banks . Therefore, U.S. banks are more susceptible to
developing country debt problems.
The debtor nations' problems have a tremendous impact not
only on the countries directly involved, but also on the
world's money markets, which means that a monetary crisis or
panic could conceivably take place. This could start with a
repudiation of debt by a large debtor country and lead to
default claims in creditor countries.
This ratio shows whether banks will write off their loan by
their own equity capital and indicates whether a bank faces
financial difficulties.
17 In 1984, most banks were in 50-90% except for Tokyo Bank
(210%) which is authorized foreign exchange.
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TABLE 4-5






















Citibank 18.2 73.5 54.6 18.2 10.0 174.5 10.5
Bank of
America 10.2 47.9 52.1 41.7 6.3 158.2 7.6
Chase
Manhattan 21.3 56.9 40.0 24.0 11.8 154.0 6.5
Morgan
Guaranty 24.4 54.3 34.8 17.5 9.7 140.7 4.4
Mannfac.
Hanover 47.5 77.7 66.7 42.4 28.4 262.7 6.8
Chemical
Bank 14.9 52.0 60.0 28.0 14.8 169.7 4.2
Continental
Illinois 17.8 22.9 32.4 21.6 12.8 107.5 2.7
Bankers
Trust 13.2 46.2 46.2 25.1 10.6 141.3 2.7
First
National 14.5 40.6 50.1 17.4 11.6 134.2 2.3
Chicago
Source: Guti Miyazaki, Seki Keizai Wo Doumiruka
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Banks which declare a default are able to call their loans
in before the due date. Particularly, in a syndicate- loan
bankers' sanctions have an important effect: A loan called
against a debtor nation unable to make immediate payment would
create more financial crisis when the debtor nation is forced
to borrow further to repay the debt. This situation, in fact,
will be avoided because the member banks with the syndicate-
loan can accept a rescheduling agreement with debtor nations.
Examples of rescheduling agreements occurred with in the
April 1981 debtor problems of Poland, and the case of Mexico
in August of 1982. In the case of a moratorium or a
repudiation by either Poland or Mexico, U.S. banks with loans
to these developing countries might have gone into bankruptcy.
Mexico's debt crisis in 1986 was avoided by providing an
emergency loan and a rescheduling agreement. Loans totaled
$12 billion and included $1.6 billion from the IMF, $1.9
billion from the World Bank, and $6 billion from private
banks
.
Several proposals for possible solutions to the debtor
nations' problems have been made. One, the Baker proposal,
made by the former Secretary of US Treasury James Baker III
(1985 to 1988), set forth the idea "...that countries would
receive new lending from the banks and the official creditors
in return for undertaking programs of economic adjustment and
reform" [Ref. 9]. Another, made by US Treasury Secretary
36
Nicholas Brady in March 1989, suggested that governments of
industrialized countries should plan to devote at least $30
billion to $40 billion over the next three years to help buy
back third world debt at discount. But these proposals have
not settled this problem. For example, recent academic
research on loan buybacks suggest that a substantial amount of
funds will end up in the hands of private banks, without
benefiting debtors [Ref. 10].
Debtor nations have had little choice but to impose harsh
austerity measures in order to comply with the bailout
programs. In general, conditions of bailout loans included
1. making an effort towards equilibrium in the
balance of international payments,
2. cutting public spending and adopting tax increases
and
3. seeking wage concessions consistent with
productivity
.
Debtor nations have found it very difficult to implement these
conditions politically, and economically. Contradictions
exist between some austerity measures and economic growth.
18As far as capital flight in the debtor nations is
concerned, nearly half of the capital outflow is a result of
inflationary hedging. Under the present circumstances,
restricting capital flight will be difficult even though
severe conditions are currently imposed, because interest
18The ratio of a capital flight to a capital inflow was 41.1%
in 1979-1982 [Ref. 11]
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rates in the U.S. and Europe are high and attractive to debtor
nations seeking to increase their capital reserves. Bailout
loans are often placed in foreign accounts to preserve the
capital and earn interest. In order to prevent capital
flight, debtor nations are forced to increase interest rates.
This inhibits investment. Moreover, the higher the risk
associated with investments, the higher the interest rate
typically charged, further inhibiting investment. At the same
time, primary product prices and world economic growth are
low; and exports of debtor nations are declining.
Attenuating factors for this problem include exempting
debtor nations from interest payments and increasing the
supply of loanable funds from the IMF and the World Bank.
Up to 1985 the increase in debt due to higher interest
rates amounted to $220 billion in the debtor nations [Ref.
12]. Reducing the interest burden is difficult for lenders.
However, connecting interest payments with economic growth
19
rates could be a move in the right direction . Originally
the IMF and the World Bank were started with the purpose of
developing the world economy and promoting international
monetary collaboration and trade. Today their mission appears
to deal primarily with the debt problem.
19Negative growth rates would presumably result in zero
interest payments, although the incentive structure created by such
a proposal should be carefully examined.
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V. LESSONS OF HISTORY
Problems such as an insufficient flow of funds to debtor
nations are not unique, and they are potential stumbling
blocks for the further development of the world economy.
Here, a look will be taken at the world economy from the 19th
century to show how essential a smooth circulation of
international funds and free trade system are for the stable
development of the world economy.
A. CIRCULATION OF FUNDS AND FREE TRADE IN THE 19TH CENTURY
The international circulation of funds and the free trade
system operating in the 19th century was primarily supported
by Great Britain and played a major role in the smooth
20development of the world economy . Great Britain underwent
an industrial revolution from the latter half of the 18th
century to the first half of the 19th century and expanded
production, in effect becoming the "world's factory."
Great Britain established itself as an industrial power in
the latter half of the 1890s. Thanks to its industrial might,
Great Britain was able to encourage a free trade system.
Despite being an overwhelmingly strong industrial power, Great
Britain never demanded that its partner countries adopt
20For a good discussion of Great Britain's role, see Yasaburou,
Kawasaki. "Kyoukou, " Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten Inc., 1984.
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similar open trade systems. Neither did it urge the
elimination of trade restrictions which would have been to its
advantage and ultimately would have created even more
opportunities for trade in the world as a whole. Particular
note should be taken of this. At the time, Great Britain
accounted for about two-tenths of global trade, and its free
trade policy contributed greatly to the growth of global trade
and the world economy.
The real growth rate of global trade was an average annual
2.8% from 1820 to 1840; the figure for the world economy
during that same period was 2.9%. From 1840 to 1870 the
growth of global trade and the world economy increased,
reaching 5.1% and 3.3% respectively. [Ref. 13]
Great Britain's trade balance was in the red starting in
1816, the first year that international balance of payment
statistics were established. With the establishment of a free
trade system through such means as the abolition of the Corn
21Laws and the reduction of tariffs, deficits in merchandise
trade grew much larger. Nevertheless, the current account
surplus grew, due to the surpluses on the higher maritime
shipping (services) account and investment earnings account
(see Figure 5-1). Great Britain thus became the world's
largest creditor nation and began exporting capital throughout
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the world. A characteristic feature of this period is that
Great Britain circulated funds, meeting the burgeoning demand
for funds by the U.S. and other countries which had
industrialized at a later date. In particular, there was a
high rate of both private and government spending on "social
capital" such as canals and railroads, which promoted the
development of infrastructure, encouraged investment and
production and contributed to industrialization.
B. THE WORLD ECONOMY BETWEEN THE WARS AND THE GREAT
DEPRESSION
The U.S. began full-scale industrialization in the mid-
19th century after the Civil War and expanded its production
capacity. From 1860 to 1880 the manufacturing production
index rose 2.6 fold [Ref. 14]. At the time, the U.S. imported
most of its capital, as well as capital goods such as
materials for railroad construction, from Great Britain,
thereby providing the foundation for its future industrial
production. As a result, exports grew.
Starting in the 1870s, although there were some ups and
down due to business cycles, the U.S. enjoyed surpluses in
merchandise trade. This trend became more marked from World
War I, when its surplus on the current account grew further.
In the 1910s, the U.S. recorded current account surpluses of
about an average annual 2.8% of its GNP and after World War I
became the world's largest creditor nation [Ref. 14].
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In Great Britain's case, the principal form of capital
exports was investment in securities leading to augmentation
of the foundations for production in other nations, such as
the construction of railroads and canals. The exports of
capital from the U.S. mostly constituted purchases of already
issued securities sold by Great Britain for raising wartime
funds, investment in securities for postwar programs such as
the Dose Bonds, and other securities investment not directly
tied to production. Further, the fatigue of Europe after the
Great War and the agricultural recession in Latin America and
elsewhere following upon a slump in the market for primary
products increased the risks of foreign investment. Thus,
there were few places to invest overseas.
The U.S. economy, on the other hand, was doing well, so
American funds tended to be used for investment in the U.S.
The concentration of capital in the U.S., which should have
been a capital exporter, and the failure of funds to circulate
smoothly for the reconstruction of Europe coupled with the
economic development needs of Latin America may be considered
to have fostered a weakness in the economic foundations of the
countries in those regions.
Concurrently, there was a boom in speculative stock
investment based on credit transactions reflecting the good
performance of commerce and industry in what has been called
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22the "Roaring 20s" . In 1929, however, a chain reaction of
plummeting stock prices triggered by credit uncertainties in
a few companies, caused financial institutions to
simultaneously move to reclaim debts. The domestic money
supply shrank and the domestic economy tumbled into a
depression.
From 1921 through 1929, the money supply expanded at an
annual rate of 2.7 %, slightly less rapidly than the growth in
the output of goods and services. Beginning in 1930, monetary
policy suddenly shifted. The supply of money declined by 6.9
% during 1930, by 10.9 % in 1931, and by 4.7 % in 1932. Banks
failed, and the Federal Reserve Bank also failed to act as a
lender of last resort to head off the huge decline in the
supply of money. From 1929 to 1933, the quantity of money in
circulation declined by 27 %. [Ref. 15]
To deal with this depression, the American government
instituted trade restrictions through a high tariff policy
based on the Smoot-Hawley Act to protect domestic industries
and further raised the prime rate in October 1931 from 1.5% to
3.5% to maintain the gold standard [Ref. 16]. These measures
only served to further deepen the depression. As a result,
U.S. trade shrank 70% from 1929 to 1932 [Ref. 16].
22For a good discussion of this stock boom in the U.S., see
White, Eugene N. "The stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929
Revisited," The Journal of Economic Perspectives, p. 67-83, Spring
1990.
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In capital transactions in the 1930s, both direct
investment and securities investment fell, causing the long
term capital balance to change from a deficit of an average
annual $560 million in 1928 to 1929 to a surplus of an average
annual $50 million in 1930 to 1933; so capital exports
stagnated. In addition, the high tariff policies of the U.S.
stirred up a chain reaction of retaliatory measures by other
countries, causing a reduction in global trade and inhibiting
the flow of global capital.
This in turn caused many countries with weak economic
foundations, in particular the Latin American countries with
their debt problems and the agricultural countries of Eastern
Europe to suffer from a large decrease of exports and thus
debt crises. The global economy stagnated (see Figure 5-2).
The lesson to be drawn from the above cases of Great
Britain and the U.S. is that the free trade system and the
smooth circulation of funds appear to be the keys to global
economic development through the establishment of a common
economic foundation among different countries. Thus a warning
bell must be sounded whenever there is rising protectionism,
and/or significant debtor countries struggle under the burden
of repaying their debts.
45












Production of Mining and
Manufacturing Industries
of the Free World
1926 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 (Year)
Source: Rostov, W.W. "The World Economy: History and
Prospect"
Figure 5-2
U.S. Tariff Rates and U.S. Status in the
World Economy and Trade around the Great Depression
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VI. A COMPARISON OF THE 1920s AND THE 1980s
There are similarities between the economic climates of
the 1920s and the 1980s. This chapter examines some of those
similarities, as well as some differences.
Figure 6-1 contrasts some economic characteristics common
to both periods. Ten categories are included:
1
.
The world monetary system
2. The balance of international payments
3. The declining price of primary products
4. Debtor nations' problems
5. The existence of hegemonic nation
6. Stock market activity
7. Foreign investments
8. Interest-rate differentials
9. Rising tides of protectionism
10. The gestation period of fundamental innovation
In the first category of comparison, the collapse of the
Bretton Woods system near the end of the Vietnam War was
similar to the collapse of the Gold Standard system after
World War I. Moreover, new systems developed subsequent to
the Gold Exchange Standard system and the Smithsonian
monetary system have also collapsed.
In the second category, we can attribute most of the
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increasing deficit in the current account due to rebuilding
after World War I. Similar deficits were experienced by the
U.S. after the Vietnam War. In both cases increased
government spending for wars resulted in deficits and in the
crowding out of private domestic investment.
Category three presents a similarity between the 1920s and
the 1980s in falling prices of primary products. In category
four as mentioned in Chapter IV, a financial crisis today will
be avoided as long as bridge loans from the IMF, the World
Bank, and private banks are extended to debtor nations. In
category five, the position of the U.S. as a hegemonic nation
in the world today is gradually declining, but whether that
power will be transferred to Japan or Germany is unclear.
A similarity can also be found in movements of the stock
market, but conditions are not such that Japan money would be
withdrawn from the U.S. It is more likely that such foreign
investments would be recalled, if, for example, there is a
shrinkage of interest-rate differential between the U.S. and
Japan.
Foreign investments from Japan to the U.S. have the effect
of raising purchasing power in the U.S. As a result, U.S.
imports increase. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the
purchasing power of the U.S. contributes towards the growth of
world trade. On the other hand, since, as a result of Japan
money being concentrated in the U.S., Japan money in
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developing countries remains limited, thus it does not
contribute to the industrial modernization in these countries.
This point is a warning factor, which means that debtor
nations' problems might get worse, and the lack of Japanese
investment in developing countries might yet create a world
financial crisis.
Real-interest rates in the U.S. remain relatively high.
Some agreements between both governments might be reached on
concerted action to encourage continued Japanese investment in
the U.S. But the long- lasting effect of such action is
questionable, because forced restriction of monetary growth to
dampen the excessive pace of economic activity would cause
Japan's interest rates to rise. This is an important factor
which suggests the possibility of Japan money's withdrawal
from the U.S. market.
The rising tide of protectionism, category nine, depends
on the U.S. Congress and Japanese negotiators. The House of
Representatives has a stronger connection with the electorate
than the Senate and has threatened the application of U.S.
23Super Article 301 when Japanese manufactured goods make
particularly sharp advances in U.S. markets. As long as
23The USTR cites Japan whether non-tariff barriers to trade
exist in Japan with the Super Article 301. For example, in May 26,
1989, from the 34 items which were the subject of the annual report
of the USTR, three items - super computers, satellites and forestry
products - were decided on as authorization items based on the
Super Article 301.
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disequilibria in the balance of international payments are not
resolved, protectionist sentiment in the U.S. Congress may be
intensified. Once the protectionist mood takes hold, it is
difficult to resist its pressure (witness the Smoot-Hawley Act
of 1930)
.
In order to clarify connections between the economic
environment of the 1920s and the 1980s, let us examine some
economic conditions in the 1920s by using a flow chart.
Figure 6-2 shows the mechanism that may have led to the Great
Depression. Part one describes the stage from the end of
World War I to the early 1920s and part two describes the
stage from the early 1920s to 1928.
Part one in the Figure 6-2 shows that there were four
economic factors:
1. The appearance of the U.S. as a newly industrializing
country.
2. The global recession due to the excess supply of
industrial and agricultural products.
3. The recession in agriculture.
4. The collapse of the Gold Standard system.
Part two shows today's debtor nations' problems overlapping
with the debtor nations' problems of the 1920s. The
relationship between the high yen and the weakened dollar of
1991 can be likened to that of the high dollar and the
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categories six through eight in Figure 6-1 appeared until
1928. Part two fit with the 1980s economic situations.
Consider U.S. capital investments in detail. Figure 6-3
shows the trends of the international balance of payments in
the U.S. from 1921 to 1932. The U.S. trade balance moved
toward a position of underlying surplus after World War I
.
Most U.S. exports before the war were primary products, mainly
agricultural commodities; after the war, exports of industrial
products increased.
U.S. capital investment over the period 1921-32 was
substantial. In particular, long-term capital investment from
1924 through 1928 increased sharply. The supply of dollars
from these investments in European countries played an
important role in reconstructing and maintaining a gold-
standard system. The main destinations of U.S. external
investments in those days were Germany and Latin America (see
Figure 6-1 and 6-2).
U.S. capital invested in Germany was used mainly for
reconstruction. As a result of these investments, funds
poured back to the U.S. through the European countries' war
debt payments. An important role of capital investment is to
contribute to economic development in debtor nations. The
U.S. investment in Latin America did not have the desired
effect, because increased productivity in agriculture helped
cause a global supply glut.
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With the stock market boom in 1928, the U.S. absorbed both
domestic and overseas funds. U.S. external investments
sharply decreased from the middle of 1928 (see Figure 6-3).
In those days, the U.S. interest rate was kept lower than that
of Great Britain; but U.S. monetary authorities pursued a more
vigorous tight-money policy in an attempt to restrict a
speculative stock boom which began to absorb funds. The
shrinkage of the interest-rate differential between the U.S.
and Great Britain due to the tight-money policy exacerbated
the slowdown in U.S. external investments.
According to part two in Figure 6-2 and the discussion
above, the world economy appears to have been barely sustained
by U.S. foreign investments. A major trigger of the Great
Depression was the withdrawal of U.S. foreign investments from
Europe and developing countries when the U.S. stock market
collapsed. Moreover, many politicians at the time did not
anticipate the potential destructiveness of higher tariff
rates, and many economists did not forsee the consequences of
reductions in the money supply.
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VII. THE ECONOMIC ROLES FOR JAPAN
Throughout the preceding chapters the emphasis has been
placed on Japan money which is currently helping to sustain
U.S. federal budget deficits. The budget consists mainly of
private capital that could be withdrawn due to economic
uncertainties in the future. Two methods are considered to
avoid a potential crisis in the event Japan money is withdrawn
from the U.S.
Japan's primary role in future world economic and trade
relations will be in expanding its imports and, through its
global companies, making direct investments abroad. Because
of the high-yen in recent years, Japan's direct investment
abroad has been expanding quite rapidly (see Figure 7-1).
Japan now ranks third in the world in terms of the outstanding
balance of direct investment abroad (see Figure 7-2). Direct
investment abroad provides significant benefits to the economy
of the country concerned; through creation of employment,
transfer of technology and the development of new industries.
Overseas production through direct investment also makes a
contribution to the country concerned through the transfer of
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Figure 7-1
Trends in Japan's Direct Investment Abroad
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like security investments, but rather a transfer of human
capital
.
As of the end of 1988, net overseas assets of Japan were
about $290 billion [Ref. 17]. Given an average investment
return of 8% or 9%, this represents an income of about $25
billion per year. This is equivalent to about a third of the
current account surplus. Most direct investments resulting in
capital flows from foreign nations are high yield; but the
average yield on Japanese direct investment is surprisingly
low. However, the objective of "short-term procurement, [but]
long-term management [Ref. 18]" - has contributed to a
dramatic increase in investment profitability in the last few
years. Even so, returns remain low when compared to the
potential return represented by alternative assets. As
investment matures, however, investment profits will
contribute significantly to an improvement in the balance of
payments.
Japan is likely to remain a capital exporter for the
following reasons [Ref. 19]:
1. Japan is expected to have excessive savings
deposits from now into the 21st century.
2. There are nations, such as developing nations with
a strong demand for capital.
3. Other developed nations such as Germany which could
provide investment capital have pressing domestic
concerns requiring that capital.
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It is unclear if other developed countries can become capital
exporters or not; but it is quite natural for Japan, with
large trade surpluses and a high savings rate to supply
capital.
Japan's second role will be in dealing with matters which
cannot be resolved solely by the market mechanism or free
trade system, such as economic cooperation (see Chapter III).
One example of this is the contribution to the stability of
the economies of the developing countries. To achieve
stability and sustain growth in the economies of developing
countries, especially of the debtor nations, the adoption of
suitable development policies is important. Providing aid
tailored to the diverse development needs of these countries
is essential for economic cooperation.
Economic growth in developing countries relies in part on
the actions of the developing countries themselves; but
increases in direct investment accompanying technology
transfers, expanded trade, and economic cooperation would seem
to be contributions Japan can make. The global economy, while
facing various problems, is speeding through the 1990s on the
way to a new century of unprecedented development. Japan has
steadily strengthened its position in the world economy and,
along with this, is being looked upon with increased
expectations regarding its role in promoting the smooth and
stable development of world trade. It is incumbent upon Japan
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to be aware of this and to continue to contribute positively
to the stability and growth of the international economy while
giving full consideration to the economic lessons of history.
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